ABSTRACT
Background: understanding and improving access to essential services in (post)-conflict settings requires paying particular attention to the actors who occupy the space left ‘empty’ by weak or deficient State institutions. Religious institutions often play a fundamental role among these actors and typically benefit from high trust capital, a rare resource in so-called ‘fragile’ States. While part of the literature has looked at the role faith organisations can play to mobilise and sensitise communities during emergencies, our focus is on a different, essential dimension: the reconfiguration of the relationship between religion and health authorities impelled by health crises. Methods: : we analyse observations, interviews, and focus group discussions with 21 leaders from eight different religious categories in Ituri province in 2020-2021. Results: : we show how faith institutions handled the Covid-19 lockdown period, notably by using and redeploying structures at the grassroots level but also by responding to health authorities’ call for support. New actors usually not associated with the health system, such as revivalist churches, got involved. The closure of worship places during the lockdown shocked all faith leaders; some saw it as a test of faith while others criticised inconsistent State measures, but, ultimately, most were inclined to follow and support health authorities. Such experience was, however, often one of frustration and feeling unheard. The interviewed religious leaders, especially those whose congregations were not previously involved in healthcare provision, felt that they were doing a favour to the State and the health authorities. Such service is at the level of community-level awareness-raising, but also, crucially, leaders were aware that by publicly committing themselves against Covid-19, they were participating in an effort to depoliticise Covid-19 in a context where the response to past epidemics, especially Ebola, is highly contentious. Conclusions: : in the short run, depoliticization may help address health emergencies, but in the longer run and in the absence of a credible space for discussion, it may affect the constructive criticism of health system responses and health system strengthening. The faith leaders’ frustration with the ‘collaboration’ with health authorities (especially for the new actors) also limits its long-term potential.
Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Communication DisordersABSTRACT
French Abstract: En septembre 2019, les frais d'études, qui servaient (entre autres) à payer les enseignants non rémunérés par l’Etat, ont été officiellement supprimés dans les écoles primaires de la DR Congo. Quelques mois plus tard, le gouvernement fermait les écoles pour 4 mois et demi à cause de la pandémie de Covid-19. À l'aide d'une enquête auprès de 822 enseignants et 715 parents d’élèves conduite avant et après le confinement et de 157 entretiens qualitatifs dans la province du Sud-Kivu, nous montrons que la réforme « Gratuité » semble avoir à la fois atténué et exacerbé les effets des restrictions liées à la pandémie. Dopés par la gratuité, l’effectif scolaire et les relations entre enseignants-fonctionnaires et parents restent stables –et ce malgré l’absence presque totale d’enseignement pour les plus démunis pendant la période de fermeture. Cependant, les privations additionnelles et le stress de la pandémie rendent encore plus intenable la position des non-fonctionnaires, qui quittent la profession en nombre et, par-là, menacent la stabilité du système éducatif. La durabilité des réformes visant la gratuité, spécialement en contexte de crises répétées, ne peut se faire en l’absence d’une ambitieuse et inclusive refonte des ressources humaines. English Abstract: In September 2019, school fees, which were used to pay teachers not paid by the State (among others), were officially abolished in DR Congo's primary schools. A few months later, the government closed schools for four and a half months due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Using a survey of 822 teachers and 715 parents conducted before and after the closure and 157 qualitative interviews in South Kivu province, we show that the free education reform seems to have both mitigated and exacerbated the effects of the pandemic-related restrictions. Boosted by gratuity, school enrolment and relations between teacher-staff and parents has remained stable -despite the almost total absence of education for the poorest during the closure period. However, the additional deprivation and stress of the pandemic has made the position of non-staff teachers even more untenable, as they leave the profession in large numbers, thereby threatening the stability of the entire primary education system. The sustainability of free education reforms, especially in the context of repeated crises, cannot eschew complementary, similarly ambitious, and necessarily inclusive human resources reforms.
Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Tourette Syndrome , Distal MyopathiesABSTRACT
This paper provides evidence that the COVID-19-related mortality rate of national government ministers and heads of state has been substantially higher than that of people with a similar sex and age profile in the general population, a trend that is driven by African cases (17 out of 24 reported deaths worldwide, as of 15 February 2021). Ministers' work frequently puts them in close contact with diverse groups, and therefore at higher risk of contracting COVID-19, but this is not specific to Africa. This paper discusses four non-mutually exclusive hypotheses for the Africa-specific trend, involving co-morbidity, poorly-resourced healthcare and possible restrictions in accessing out-of-country health facilities, the underreporting of cases, and the disproportionate impact of the so-called ‘South African’ variant (501Y.V2). The paper then turns its attention to the public health and political implications of the trend. While governments have measures in place to cope with the sudden loss of top officials, the COVID-19-related deaths have been associated with substantial changes in public health policy in cases where the response to the pandemic had initially been contested or minimal. Ministerial deaths also result in a reconfiguration of political leadership, but we do not expect a wave of younger and more gender representative replacements. Rather, we speculate that a disconnect may emerge between the top leadership and the public, with junior ministers filling the void and in so doing putting themselves more at risk of infection. Opposition politicians may also be at significant risk of contracting COVID-19.